Thursday, April 23, 2026

Meritless ERISA Claims, the Cunningham v. Cornell Burden-Shift and Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Pushback

 


Meritless ERISA Claims, the Cunningham v. Cornell Burden-Shift and Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Pushback

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.

April 23, 2026

Article at 52 Journal of Pension Planning & Compliance 1 (Summer 2026) :
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_6JUGOJEpYQBpwXdjnVqvVgZnRQjerZI/

See Addendum below

The Supreme Court's 2025 decision in Cunningham v. Cornell University lowered the initial hurdles of ERISA litigation. These lawsuits typically take the form of excessive fee class actions. Plaintiff firms use template complaints (often with investigative information shared by the DOL) to allege that fiduciaries (i) failed to monitor recordkeeping fees, (ii) retained underperforming funds, or (iii) used expensive retail share classes instead of institutional ones. Cunningham v. Cornell University shifted the burden of proving exemptions for routine service contracts to plan sponsors. This made it easier for plaintiffs to survive early motions to dismiss.

However, 2026 has brought strong pushback against meritless ERISA claims and the lowered pleading standard. It's clear that courts and lawmakers are looking for ways to stop baseless claims. This article explores (i) the practical consequences of the Cunningham burden-shift, (ii) recent judicial efforts to filter meritless claims using standing and fee-shifting to plaintiff attorneys for frivolous claims, (iii) new legislative attempts to restore the burden of proof to plaintiffs, and (iv) a 2026 change in DOL Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA) enforcement policy and prohibition of EBSA using secret common interest agreements with the plaintiff bar.

ERISA § 408 Exemptions as Affirmative Defenses

In Cunningham v. Cornell University, 604 U.S. 693 (Apr. 17, 2025), the Supreme Court considered a challenge to recordkeeping and administrative fee arrangements in Cornell University’s defined contribution retirement plans. Participants alleged that the plans paid excessive compensation to recordkeepers and other service providers and that plan fiduciaries failed to prudently monitor those arrangements, thereby permitting the payment of allegedly unreasonable compensation for necessary services in alleged breach of their duties of loyalty and prudence under ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). In addition to these fiduciary-duty claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the same fee payments constituted prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), on the theory that the payments were made to service providers that were “parties in interest” to the plans. The district court and the Second Circuit rejected the prohibited transaction claim, reasoning that plaintiffs were required at the pleading stage to allege facts showing that the statutory prohibited-transaction exemption for reasonable compensation for necessary services under ERISA § 408(b)(2)(A) did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff states a prohibited-transaction claim under § 406(a)(1)(C) by plausibly alleging the existence of a transaction between a plan and a party in interest, and that the applicability of a § 408 exemption is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by defendants rather than negated by plaintiffs in the complaint.

Practical Consequences for Routine Service Arrangements

Because recordkeepers and similar service providers are, by definition, parties in interest under ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), Cunningham renders routine service arrangements prima facie prohibited transactions at the pleading stage, subject only to later proof of an applicable exemption. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court’s reasoning means that most routine contracts between a plan and a service provider constitute a prohibited transaction under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C) for pleading purposes unless and until the fiduciary affirmatively establishes the applicability of a § 408 exemption. Absent that exemption, ordinary plan relationships, including recordkeeping, trustee, custodial, investment advisory, and actuarial arrangements, would be presumptively unlawful at the pleading stage, notwithstanding their ubiquity and arm’s-length nature.

Although the Court acknowledged concerns that its interpretation could expose ordinary plan arrangements to costly "fishing expeditions," it emphasized that district courts retain procedural tools to screen weak claims, including Article III standing requirements, Rule 7(a) orders, limits on discovery, Rule 11 sanctions, and fee-shifting under ERISA § 502(g)(1). In practice, however, these tools typically operate only after litigation has commenced and often after substantial defense costs have already been incurred.

Against that backdrop, in light of Cunningham, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should assume that ordinary service contracts are more likely to be challenged even in the absence of any specific wrongdoing, and should be prepared to explain, on paper and in plain terms, why each service provider was selected, how fees were reviewed, and why the arrangement makes sense for the plan.

Criticism of Cunningham as Expanding Prohibited-Transaction Litigation Beyond Its Intended Scope

Although the Supreme Court described Cunningham as a straightforward application of ERISA’s statutory structure, many commentators have questioned whether the decision aligns with economic reality and the historical purpose of ERISA’s prohibited-transaction rules and fiduciary-duty framework. By allowing prohibited-transaction claims to proceed without any allegation that compensation was excessive, unreasonable, or the result of a flawed fiduciary process, Cunningham permits plaintiffs to challenge routine, arm’s-length service arrangements that have traditionally been viewed as permissible so long as compensation is reasonable and services are necessary.

From a litigation standpoint, Cunningham makes it easier for plaintiffs to add prohibited-transaction claims to otherwise weak excessive-fee complaints in order to avoid the more demanding pleading standards that apply to ERISA § 404 prudence claims. Plaintiffs use the prohibited transaction rules as a backdoor to revive excessive fee claims when they lack direct evidence of actual fiduciary imprudence or unreasonable market rates. Because nearly all service providers qualify as parties in interest, plaintiffs generally need only allege the existence of a service relationship to survive a motion to dismiss under § 406. This shifts early litigation away from whether fees were excessive or fiduciary decision-making was imprudent and instead places immediate pressure on plan sponsors to defend ordinary plan operations. As a result, ERISA’s prohibited-transaction provisions—originally intended to prevent self-dealing and other prohibited transactions—risk being used primarily as a procedural tool to increase settlement leverage in cases where no concrete fiduciary misconduct or participant harm has been plausibly alleged.

Post-Cunningham Reduction in Successful Motions to Dismiss in ERISA Fee Cases

Since the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Cunningham, motions to dismiss ERISA fee cases, particularly prohibited-transaction claims under ERISA § 406, have been granted less frequently. Courts are increasingly allowing cases to proceed based solely on allegations that a plan paid fees to a service provider that qualifies as a party in interest. As a result, lawsuits that likely would have been dismissed before Cunningham are now advancing into costly discovery, including cases involving mid-sized plans that historically were not frequent litigation targets.

Judicial Pushback

Rule 7(a) Orders. In response to Cunningham, more courts are utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) to require plaintiffs to file a reply to an answer regarding reasonableness and exemptions before allowing discovery to proceed, as the Supreme Court in Cunningham suggested. For example, in Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL 3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025), a California federal court ordered a Rule 7(a) reply to compel plaintiffs to address ERISA exemptions with "specific, nonconclusory factual allegations" before discovery could begin. Although the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss by alleging a "prohibited transaction" under the Cunningham standard, the court used Rule 7(a) to address the "procedural issue" that otherwise allows "meritless" cases to reach discovery.

Article III Standing. A recent 2026 ruling highlights how courts are using Article III standing as a "constitutional gatekeeper" to dismiss prohibited transaction claims that might otherwise satisfy statutory pleading requirements. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), a North Carolina federal court dismissed an ERISA class action for lack of Article III standing, holding that a "bare allegation" of a relationship with a party in interest is insufficient without specific allegations of a concrete injury. The court held that despite recent Supreme Court guidance lowering the statutory pleading bar for prohibited transactions, plaintiffs must still identify a non-speculative financial loss actually affecting their individual accounts to satisfy constitutional requirements. Ultimately, the court found the plaintiffs' allegations were too speculative because they failed to show that their own account balances declined or that the recordkeeping and advisory services provided weren't worth what the plan paid. The court dismissed the claims without prejudice, reinforcing that statutory violations alone do not confer standing.

Fee-Shifting and Attorney Accountability. Beyond procedural rules, courts are exploring fee-shifting to deter meritless litigation. In November 2025, a U.S. district judge granted summary judgment to the defendants in Whipple v. Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-04583-SAL (D.S.C. Nov. 25, 2025), dismissing a class action that alleged the company paid $3.5 million in excessive 401(k) recordkeeping fees. The ruling for the employer hinged on the court's Daubert exclusion of the plaintiffs' sole expert witness, which prevented them from establishing loss causation under ERISA. Following this dismissal, the defendants filed a motion in early 2026 under ERISA § 502(g)(1) to shift over $1 million in defense costs specifically to the plaintiffs' law firm (but not to the named participants). In an unusual but growing trend, the defense cited Cunningham guidance to argue that the firm itself bear these costs to deter "baseless" class actions that exploit lower pleading standards to force expensive discovery.

Legislative Developments

Congress has recently focused on the practical consequences of recent ERISA litigation trends. On December 2, 2025, the House Education and Workforce Subcommittee held a hearing entitled “Pension Predators: Stopping Class Action Abuse Against Workers’ Retirement,” which examined whether developments such as Cunningham have contributed to an increase in ERISA class actions driven more by procedural leverage than by demonstrable fiduciary misconduct. Witnesses and members of Congress expressed concern that lower pleading thresholds may impose substantial litigation costs on plans and ultimately reduce retirement benefits borne by participants.

On March 17, 2026, the House Education and Workforce Committee passed the ERISA Litigation Reform Act (H.R. 6084) by a vote of 19-13. This bill aims to (i) shift the burden of proof back to plaintiffs, requiring them to plausibly allege that a transaction isn't exempt under Section 408 at the pleading stage, (ii) require "meaningful benchmarks" for performance claims, (iii) mandate an automatic stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending, and (iv) require plaintiffs to prove that service provider fees were neither reasonable nor necessary. Proponents argue this restores the "innocent until proven guilty" principle for plan fiduciaries.

DOL New Enforcement Guidance and Restrictions of DOL Information Sharing with Plaintiff Bar

Recent congressional hearings exposed a troubling alliance between the DOL and plaintiff attorneys. On July 22, 2025, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce investigated the DOL EBSA's use of secret common interest agreements. It was recently discovered and reported at the hearing that the EBSA uses these of secret common interest agreements with plaintiff attorneys to spoon-feed confidential investigative data to those law firms. This practice gives plaintiff attorneys unfair leverage in the case. Lawmakers heavily criticized this practice, with some calling it a blatant abuse of the law. See https://tinyurl.com/412636. In response, the DOL Inspector General launched an official audit into the information sharing by EBSA and plaintiff attorneys. A bill was also introduced in Congress, the Balance the Scales Act (H.R. 2958), to force the agency to disclose all future common interest agreements.

To address this controversy and other issues, the DOL issued Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 on April 14, 2026, which significantly shifts the EBSA 2026 enforcement priorities. It outlines that the DOL will shift its focus to (i) egregious conduct and loyalty breaches, (ii) avoid regulation by enforcement, (iii) require senior leadership review for critical initiatives, and (iv) ensure timely investigations. Also, the bulletin specifically prohibits agency staff from coordinating enforcement activities with plaintiff attorneys pursuing private actions. The bulletin also sets strict investigation deadlines, with routine investigations required to close within 18 months, and complex cases required to close within 30 months.

Evolving Theories: Pleading Standards and Loss Causation

Supreme Court Seeks Solicitor General Input. Following Cunningham, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States on whether to grant certiorari in two ERISA class actions highlighting significant circuit splits. On December 9, 2025, the Solicitor General urged the Court to grant certiorari in Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson and Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc. (both cited below) and supported plan sponsor and fiduciary defendants on the merits. This reflected a shift toward a more pragmatic interpretation by endorsing meaningful-benchmark pleading standards and rejecting expansive burden-shifting theories of loss causation.

Pleading Standards in Parker-Hannifin and Intel Corp. In Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson, 122 F.4th 205 (6th Cir. 2024), the Sixth Circuit allowed an investment-performance challenge to proceed without requiring the plaintiff to plausibly allege a "meaningful benchmark," which allows the court to determine whether plaintiffs have alleged plausible claims to survive a motion to dismiss, an approach taken by some circuits, while other circuits merely require a showing of meaningful comparability. While the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear the case and reverse the Sixth Circuit's lenient standard, the Supreme Court is still considering whether to grant certiorari as of March 2026. However, the Court has already agreed to resolve this specific "meaningful benchmark" split in a related case, Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, the Court granted certiorari in January 2026.

Loss Causation in Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc. In Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc., 111 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2024), the Eleventh Circuit held that ERISA plaintiffs retain the burden of proving loss causation even after establishing a breach of fiduciary duty and a loss, rejecting a burden-shifting framework adopted by several other circuits. The Solicitor General supported this view, arguing that the burden should remain with the plaintiffs. Following the filing of the Solicitor General's brief, the plaintiffs chose to abandon their appeal, and the Supreme Court therefore dismissed the petition on January 8, 2026.

Meaningful Benchmarks in Anderson v. Intel. In Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, 137 F.4th 1015 (9th Cir. 2025), participants in its retirement plans alleged that trustees imprudently invested in risky hedge funds and private equity that yielded lower returns than traditional investments. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the participants' claims, ruling that they failed to plausibly allege a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA as the complaint did not provide  meaningful benchmarks with similar investment aims, risks, and objectives.  The Supreme Court granted review on January 16, 2026, to resolve whether plaintiffs challenging investment underperformance must identify a "meaningful benchmark" at the pleading stage to satisfy ERISA's duty of prudence.  

Looking Ahead

The current landscape of ERISA litigation is highly volatile. Cunningham gave plaintiffs significant procedural leverage, but the recent judicial, legislative, and administrative pushback shows that the pendulum may be swinging back. DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 strengthens this defense trend. Plan sponsors gain protection from endless audits through new 18-month and 30-month investigation deadlines for the EBSA.ESBA Furthermore, the ban on secret common interest agreements between the EBSA and the plaintiff bar cuts off a major source of free discovery. Plan sponsors should not wait for the law to settle. They must proactively document their fiduciary processes and clearly explain why they chose specific service providers and how they negotiated fees. Moving forward, the industry is closely watching the Supreme Court's upcoming decision in Anderson v. Intel Corp. and the progress of the ERISA Litigation Reform Act and other legislative developments. These upcoming developments will determine if the Cunningham burden-shift continues to be an issue for plan sponsors.

11-17-26 Addendum

Update — November 17, 2026: Further Developments in ERISA Litigation

Since this article was posted on April 23, 2026, several developments have reinforced the growing judicial and legislative scrutiny of meritless ERISA class actions.

Supreme Court Review of ERISA Pleading Standards. On October 6, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498, involving the requirement that plaintiffs challenging investment underperformance identify a meaningful benchmark. The Ninth Circuit had dismissed the claims because plaintiffs failed to identify sufficiently comparable investments. During oral argument, several Justices appeared receptive to requiring meaningful comparisons, although the appropriate degree of comparability remains disputed. A decision is expected during the Court's 2026–2027 Term. Unlike Cunningham v. Cornell University, which addressed prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406, Anderson concerns the pleading requirements for fiduciary imprudence under § 404. See Supreme Court docket.

Judicial Safeguards Against Weak Claims. Courts have continued exploring the procedural protections identified in Cunningham. In Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL 3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025), the court required plaintiffs to respond under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a)(7) to defendants' prohibited-transaction exemption defense. However, the case subsequently proceeded toward discovery, illustrating the limitations of this safeguard. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc., No. 1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), the court dismissed claims for lack of Article III standing, emphasizing that Cunningham did not eliminate the requirement of concrete injury.

Legislative Developments. The ERISA Litigation Reform Act (H.R. 6084), which the House Education and Workforce Committee ordered reported on March 17, 2026, remains pending. The legislation would impose more demanding pleading requirements, including provisions addressing statutory exemptions and meaningful investment benchmarks, and would restrict discovery while certain dismissal motions are pending. No legislation reversing Cunningham has been enacted.

DOL Enforcement and Information Sharing. The DOL's April 14, 2026 Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 remains an important change in enforcement policy. It emphasizes serious violations, discourages regulation through enforcement, establishes 18-month and 30-month administrative investigation targets subject to exceptions, and restricts coordination with private plaintiffs' attorneys. These policies do not alter the rights of private litigants or create enforceable deadlines for investigations. See DOL Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01.

Practical Significance. Although Cunningham continues to expose routine service-provider arrangements to prohibited-transaction litigation, courts and policymakers are considering ways to prevent weak claims from imposing disproportionate litigation costs. The forthcoming Anderson decision may provide important additional guidance concerning speculative investment-performance claims. Meanwhile, plan fiduciaries should continue documenting the reasonableness of service-provider compensation, investment selection, and ongoing monitoring procedures.

 


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