Tuesday, October 25, 2022

Withdrawal Liability Actuarial Assumptions – Did New Proposed PBGC Regs Get it Wrong?



28 WK J. Deferred Comp. 7 (Winter 2023)
Nov. 11, 2022

Withdrawal Liability Actuarial Assumptions – Did New Proposed PBGC Regs Get it Wrong?

CHARLES C. SHULMAN, ESQ.
Teaneck, NJ
201-357-0577
cshulman@ebeclaw.com

 

Actuarial interest rate assumptions for Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) withdrawal liability, which are relevant for purposes of determining an employer withdrawal liability for withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan are to be made by the plan actuary using reasonable actuarial interest rate assumptions (which may sometimes be termination rate assumptions or ongoing plan assumptions or a combination depending on what is reasonable for the plan) under ERISA § 4213(a)(1). However, notwithstanding the above, once Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) are issued; the plan actuary must instead comply with such regulations in determining the actuarial interest rate assumptions. Several recent federal courts have ruled that ongoing minimum funding rates should have been used in those cases by the plan actuary in determining withdrawal liability, under ERISA § 4213(a)(1).

However, PBGC regulations under § 4213(a)(2) have just been issued in proposed form, and once finalized, plan actuaries can use plan termination interest rate assumptions, which, according to the PBGC, will apparently be deemed to comply with the actuarial assumption requirements, thus shielding the plans from legal challenges regarding their choice of the actuarial interest rate assumptions. But this is a difficult argument to make, since ERISA § 4213(a)(1) does require reasonable actuarial assumptions that can be challenged in court, and the newly proposed regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) give the plan actuary a permitted range of assumptions, (i.e., plan termination assumptions or ongoing funding assumptions or anything in between) a court could logically read these regulations and § 4213(a)(2) to require that when an actuary chooses an interest rate in the permitted range, it must be a reasonable choice.

Under ERISA § 4201, withdrawal liability is imposed on an employer that withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan based on the withdrawing employer’s allocated share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits (UVBs) which are the value of vested benefits minus the value of plan assets, as of the last day of the preceding plan year.

1.        ACTUARIAL INTEREST RATE ASSUMPTIONS TO BE REASONABLE UNDER ERISA § 4213(A) BASED ON (I) THE ACTUARY’S BEST ESTIMATE OF ANTICIPATED EXPERIENCE UNDER THE PLAN OR (II) ONCE PBGC REGULATIONS ARE FINALIZED FOLLOWING THE ACTUARIAL INTEREST RATE ASSUMPTIONS SET FORTH IN THE PBGC REGULATIONS

ERISA § 4213(a) sets forth rules regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining the UVBs of the multiemployer pension plan for purposes of determining withdrawal liability, as follows:

(i)         If the PBGC has not yet issued regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining the plan’s UVBs, then the plan actuary may use actuarial interest rate assumptions that are in the aggregate reasonable (based on the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations), and which offer the actuary’s “best estimate” of anticipated experience under the plan.

(ii)        If the PBGC has issued final regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining a plan’s UVBs, the actuary must use the actuarial assumptions and methods set forth in such PBGC regulations.

Until recently, the PBGC had not issued any regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining withdrawal liability. This left open the issue in each case as to whether the multiemployer plan’s actuary has used reasonable actuarial assumptions. However, on October 14, 2022, the PBGC issued proposed regulations that once finalized will determine the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining withdrawal liability.

2.         METHODS USED BY ACTUARIES PRIOR TO PBGC REGULATIONS

In practice, prior to final PBGC regulations, actuaries have various ways of measuring unfunded vested benefits. For a withdrawal of a participating employer in an ongoing multiemployer pension plan, it may be reasonable to use the plan’s ongoing “minimum funding” assumptions, which are typically determined at a higher interest rate, thus yielding a lower withdrawal liability, and being more favorable to withdrawing employers. (Of course, if a multiemployer plan is terminating in a mass termination, the PBGC termination rate assumptions are to be used.) On the other hand, actuaries sometimes use PBGC plan termination assumptions (or insurance company annuity close-out rates, which are substantially the same as plan termination assumptions), which uses a lower interest rate, thus yielding a higher withdrawal liability and being more favorable to the multiemployer pension fund. Use of the termination rate assumptions is apparently based on the theory that for the employer permanently withdrawing from the multiemployer plan its applicable share should be viewed in terms of a termination of the plan that is likely to occur in the future.

3.       USING ONGOING PLAN ASSUMPTIONS LEADS TO BACKLOADING: LAST MAN STANDING PROBLEM

Although a multiemployer pension plan generally does not terminate when a withdrawal of a participating employer takes place, it can be argued that withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it does not represent an ongoing funding relationship but rather a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants in the multiemployer plan. Using ongoing funding rates would likely have the result of backloading liability, with withdrawal liability obligations to be largest for those who withdraw from the fund the latest (or for those participating employers who are still participating when the multiemployer plan terminates in a mass withdrawal). This disproportionate liability on employers that remain in the multiemployer plan after most other employers have withdrawn (the last man standing) can cause disproportionate backloading of liabilities. This is further exacerbated when some of the participating employers have gone into bankruptcy.

4.        RECENT CASE-LAW CHALLENGING THE PLAN ACTUARIES’ ASSUMPTIONS ReGARDING WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY

Several recent federal cases have sided with withdrawing employers in challenging the plan actuary’s assumptions when the actuary did not use ongoing minimum funding assumptions.

D.C. Circuit Rules in a 2022 Case for the Withdrawing Employer that Ongoing Funding Obligations Should Have Been Used. In a 2022 case, the D.C. Circuit held that where the multiemployer fund actuary used plan termination interest assumption of 2.7–2.8 percent (yielding a very high withdrawal liability) even though the actuary was using a 7.5 percent assumption (the minimum funding), the plan termination assumptions must represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan, and therefore the withdrawal liability calculations were not reasonable. United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan v. Energy West Mining Company, 39 F.4th 730 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In that case, a multiemployer pension fund brought an action under ERISA against a withdrawing employer seeking to enforce arbitrators' award upholding the pension fund actuary’s calculation of withdrawal liability through the use of a risk-free termination discount rate. The D.C. Circuit overturned the arbitrator’s ruling since the termination assumption used by the plan actuary and which was not chosen based on the plan’s projected performance was not reasonable and instead, the actuary should have considered the pension funding discount rate assumptions taking into account anticipated projected investment returns as applicable for pension minimum funding.

Two Cases Challenging a Blended Rate and Holding Ongoing Minimum Funding Rate was Appropriate. Some actuaries use the blend of insurance company annuity close-out rates and plan funding assumptions. For example, the “Segal Blend” method determines a plan’s unfunded vested benefits for withdrawal liability based on a blend of (i) the insurance company annuity purchase rates used by the PBGC for plan terminations; and (ii) the actuary’s assumption of future investment returns used for determining the plan funding requirements. Although the multiemployer plan is generally not terminating in a withdrawal liability case, withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it represented not an ongoing funding relationship but a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants.

In a 2021 case, Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trustees of the Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund, 15 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2021), the Fund’s actuary used a 7.25 percent rate for minimum funding purposes, but for withdrawal-liability purposes used the Segal Blend taking the interest rate used for minimum-funding purposes and blending it with the PBGC’s published interest rates on annuities (2–3 percent), even though the actuary conceded that the PBGC annuity close-out rates would be what is used in terminating a multiemployer plan. The court ruled that this blended formula violated ERISA in this case, as using the Segal Blend in an ongoing plan violated ERISA’s mandate under ERISA § 4213(a)(1) that the interest rate for withdrawal liability calculations be based on the anticipated experience under the plan.

Likewise, a 2018 Southern District of New York case invalidated the use of the Segal Blend. New York Times Company v. Newspaper and Mail Delivers’ Publishers Pension Fund, 303 F. Supp. 3d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), holding that in a withdrawal from an ongoing plan where the minimum funding rate would be the actuary’s best estimate, blending with a lower no-risk PBGC bond rate should not be accepted as the anticipated plan experience.

5.        PROPOSED PBGC REGULATIONS THAT WHEN FINALIZED WILL PURPORTEDLY GIVE MULTIEMPLOYER PLANS INCREASED CERTAINTY IN USING PBGC TERMINATION RATE ASSUMPTION WITHOUT SECOND-GUESSING FROM COURTS

On October 14, 2022, the PBGC issued proposed regulations that once finalized would, pursuant to ERISA § 4213(a)(2), set forth in the actuarial assumptions and methods that may be used by a plan actuary for the purpose of determining an employer’s withdrawal liability.

Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11, 87 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Oct. 14, 2022). These proposed regulations were issued in part in response to the above unfavorable cases for multiemployer plan withdrawal liability, as lower withdrawal liability based on ongoing funding interest rate assumptions leaves multiemployer plans with greater underfunding, which could increase PBGC risk.

As stated in the Preamble, the proposed regulations in § 4213.11(b) make it clear that the use of ERISA § 4044 rates (plan termination assumptions), either as a standalone assumption or combined with minimum funding interest assumptions represents a valid approach to selecting an interest rate assumption to determine withdrawal liability in basically all circumstances.

Under Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11(c), assumptions and methods other than the interest assumption would have to offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11(b) would specifically permit the use of an interest rate in withdrawal liability assumptions to be ERISA § 4044 plan termination rates alone or minimum funding rates alone or anywhere in the middle, although as stated in the Preamble, the main import of the regulations is to allow plan actuaries to use of ERISA § 4044 plan termination assumptions even as a standalone assumption as a valid approach in determining withdrawal liability.

It appears from the Preamble to the proposed regulations that the PBGC believes that any interest rate assumptions permitted by the PBGC regulations would generally be shielded from challenge in arbitration or litigation since the choice of termination interest rate assumptions is a proper assumption under the regulations. The Preamble states that this could save both the plan and employers on arbitration and litigation costs, which until now have ranged from $82,500 to $222,000 for a withdrawal liability arbitration dispute, and can run over $1 million for a lengthy litigation.

The Preamble also states that the PBGC estimates that, in the 20 years following the final rule’s effective date, there will be an increase in aggregate withdrawal liability payments ranging between $804 million and $2.98 billion.

6.         COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REGULATIONS

•          There is likely to be some objections to the above-proposed PBGC regulations. Employer withdrawal liability imposes a large and often unexpected burden on unionized companies that participate in multiemployer pension plans. For many employers, the potential withdrawal liability may discourage interested buyers of the company or push the employer into bankruptcy. In addition, higher ERISA withdrawal liability amounts will further dissuade companies from using a unionized workforce with a multiemployer pension plan.

•          Under the proposed PBGC regulations, multiemployer plan actuaries are much more likely to use plan termination assumptions in calculating withdrawal liability, relying on the new regulations and the authority given under the regulations pursuant to ERISA § 4213(a)(2), which can greatly increase withdrawal liability and exacerbate the issues raised in the previous paragraph.

•          The PBGC believes that, under the proposed regulations, any assumptions used by the plan actuary, including plan termination assumptions would generally be immune from judicial challenge, and thus, there would be little ability to challenge withdrawal liability calculations. However, this purported immunity is likely to be challenged in litigation, as the PBGC regulations give a range of permitted actuarial interest rate assumptions from plan termination assumptions to ongoing minimum funding assumptions or any combination. The PBGC believes that since ERISA § 4213(a)(2) and the proposed regulations do not state anything about reasonable assumptions, the courts will view the range permitted in the regulations as a non-reviewable standard by the plan actuary not subject to judicial review. However, this is a difficult argument to make, since ERISA § 4213(a)(1) does require reasonable assumptions, and the regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) give a permitted range of assumptions, it would be a logical reading of ERISA that a choice under a range of assumptions by the plan actuary must be reasonable and could be challenged in court or arbitration.

•          Also, since interest rates and plan performance over time tend to fluctuate, fixing the withdrawal liability interest at ERISA § 4044 termination liability rates may yield an overly high withdrawal liability, which may not be warranted in the long run when the plan performance increases.

•          The proposed PBGC regulations would be effective with respect to employer withdrawals occurring on or after the final regulations are published (or some other date to be set in the final PBGC regulations), but presumably, they would be effective for purposes of valuing unfunded vested benefits as of the end of the plan year prior to the year in which the employer withdrawal occurs even if the prior plan year ended prior to the issuance of final regulations.

If you have any questions, please contact me at number or email listed above.

See also  https://drive.google.com/file/d/1926lfljr9h_omfIFvAoywDOhA8osHxnb/

 

Wednesday, August 31, 2022

Actuarial Assumptions for Withdrawal Liability



 Withdrawal Liability and Actuarial Best Estimate Assumptions – Recent Case-Law

Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
Teaneck, NJ
 201-357-0577 212-380-3834
cshulman@ebeclaw.com

Actuarial assumptions for ERISA withdrawal liability must use the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. Plan actuaries have divergent ways of measuring unfunded vested benefits for purposes of a participating employer withdrawal from a multiemployer pension plan, sometimes using: (i) ongoing minimum funding assumptions of the plan (a higher rate yields lower withdrawal liability), (ii) termination assumptions (e.g., insurance company annuity close-out rates) (a lower rate yields greater withdrawal liability) or (iii) a blend of the two rates (such as the Segal blend).  Withdrawal liability often causes disproportionate liability on companies that remain in the multiemployer plan after most other employers have withdrawn, the "last man standing" problem, particularly if ongoing minimum funding assumptions have been used for earlier withdrawals.  A 2022 D.C. Circuit Court case held that ongoing funding rates should have been used.  A 2021 Sixth Circuit case held that termination assumptions should be used.  Two 2018 cases held that a blended rate would be appropriate.  This issue is likely to continue through the courts.  Also, the PBGC may be issuing guidance on this issue.

Under ERISA, withdrawal liability is imposed on an employer that withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plans based on its allocated share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits.  ERISA § 4201.  Often, withdrawal liability results in disproportionate liability on companies that remain in the union plan after most other employers have withdrawn—the last man standing problem.

Actuary's Best Estimate of Anticipated Experience of the Plan – ERISA § 4213.  Multiemployer plan withdrawal liability is based on the multiemployer plan's unfunded vested benefits (UVBs) which are the value of vested benefits minus the value of plan assets.  ERISA § 4211.  Under ERISA § 4213, the actuarial assumptions used by the plan actuary to calculate withdrawal liability must be reasonable in the aggregate, based on the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations, and are the actuary's "best estimate" of anticipated experience under the plan.  Once the estimated benefits payments and administrative costs are determined, the actuaries must determine the present value of future liabilities, which are a determination of how much the plan needs in assets today in order to pay those liabilities in the future.  ERISA § 4213(b) provides that in determining the unfunded vested benefits of a pension fund for purposes of determining an employer’s withdrawal liability, the plan actuary may (i) rely on the most recent complete actuarial valuation used for purposes of  IRC § 412 and reasonable estimates for the interim years of the unfunded vested benefits, and (ii) in the absence of complete data, rely on the data available or on data secured by a sampling which can reasonably be expected to be representative of the status of the entire plan.    

Methods Used by Plan Actuaries.  In practice, plan actuaries have divergent ways of measuring unfunded vested benefits.  When there is a withdrawal liability of one participating employer and the fund is ongoing, it would appear reasonable to use ongoing plan minimum funding assumptions or other assumption based on expectation of the plan returns, pension plan minimum funding requirements are typically determined at a higher interest rate, thus yielding a lower withdrawal liability and is more favorable to withdrawing employers.  (Of course, if a multiemployer plan is terminating (a mass termination), the PBGC termination rate assumptions would typically be used.) On the other hand, actuaries sometimes use termination assumptions or insurance company annuity close-out rates, which uses a lower interest rate, thus yielding a higher withdrawal liability and is more favorable to the multiemployer pension fund. 

The plan funding requirements are typically determined at a higher interest rate, thus yielding a lower withdrawal liability and is more favorable to withdrawing employers.  On the other hand, the annuity close-out rates use a lower interest rate, thus yielding a higher withdrawal liability which and is more favorable to the multiemployer pension fund. 

Using Ongoing Plan Assumptions Leads to Backloading – Last Man Standing Problem. Although a multiemployer plan is generally not terminating in a withdrawal liability case, withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it represented, not an ongoing funding relationship, but a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants.  Using ongoing funding rates would likely have the result of backloading withdrawal liability obligations to be largest for those who withdraw from the fund the latest.  This disproportionate liability on companies that remain in the union plan after most other employers have withdrawn (the last man standing) causes uneven backloading of liabilities.

D.C. Circuit Court 2022 Case – Ongoing Minimum Funding Rates Should have been Considered.  In a 2022 case the D.C.  Circuit court held that where the multiemployer fund actuary used termination interest assumption of 2.7-2.8% (yielding a very high withdrawal liability) even though the actuary was using a 7.5% assumption for funding purposes, the valuation assumptions must represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan, and therefore the withdrawal liability calculations were not reasonable.  United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan v. Energy West Mining Company, 39 F.4th 730 (D.C.  Cir. 2022) (a multiemployer pension fund brought action under ERISA against a withdrawing employer seeking to enforce arbitrator's award upholding the pension fund actuary's calculation of withdrawal liability through use of a risk-free discount rate; the Circuit Court overturned the arbitrator's ruling since the termination assumption used by plan actuary, which was not chosen based on the plan's projected performance, was not reasonable and instead the actuary should have considered the pension funding discount rate assumptions taking into account anticipated projected investment returns as is applicable for pension minimum funding).

Segal Blend.  Some actuaries use the blend of insurance company annuity close-out rates and plan funding assumptions.  For example, the "Segal Blend" method determines a plan's unfunded vested benefits for withdrawal liability based on a blend of (i) the lower insurance company annuity purchase rates used by the PBGC at current market rates; and (ii) the actuary's assumption of future investment returns used for determining the plan funding requirements.  Although the multiemployer plan is generally not terminating in a withdrawal liability case, withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it represented, not an ongoing funding relationship, but a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants.   

Cases Upholding Segal Blend.  Some courts have ruled that blended rates are reasonable, so long as it was the actuary, not the plan's trustees, has chosen to use them.  See, e.g., Manhattan Ford Lincoln Inc. v. UAW Local 259 Pension Fund, 331 F. Supp. 3d 365 (D.N.J. 2018) (arbitrator was not incorrect in allowing the reliance on the Segal Blend as a withdrawal liability is different than merely funding an ongoing plan because it represented, not an ongoing funding relationship, but a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants), 2018 WL 10759131 (3d Cir. 2018) (appeal dismissed because parties settled). 

Cases Challenging Segal Blend.  Other cases, however, have held that using a blended rate of the minimum funding interest rate and insurance company annuity close-out rates in a case where the multiemployer plan is not terminated could violate ERISA.  In a 2021 case, Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trustees of the Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund, 15 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2021), the Fund's actuary used a 7.25% growth rate on assets for minimum funding purposes, and only for withdrawal-liability purposes used the Segal Blend taking the interest rate used for minimum-funding purposes (7.25%) and blending it with the PBGC's published interest rates on annuities (2–3%), even though the actuary conceded that the PBGC annuity close-out rates would be what is used in settling up a multiemployer plan.  The court ruled that this blended formula violated ERISA in this case, as using the Segal Blend in an ongoing plan violated ERISA's mandate under ERISA § 4213(a)(1) that the interest rate for withdrawal liability calculations be based on the anticipated experience under the plan). 

Likewise, a 2018 Southern District of New York district court case invalidated the use of the Segal Blend.  New York Times Company v. Newspaper and Mail Delivers’ Publishers Pension Fund, 303 F. Supp. 3d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (in a withdrawal from an ongoing plan where the minimum funding rate would be the actuary's best estimate, blending with a lower no-risk PBGC bond rates should not be accepted as the anticipated plan experience).

Watch for Future Cases and Future PBGC Guidance.  As shown above, courts are split on whether to use ongoing funding assumptions or termination assumptions or a blend of the two.  This issue is worth following to see how other Circuit Courts or the Supreme Court will rule.  Also, the PBGC has not yet issued regulations or other guidance on what the actuary's best estimate of anticipated experience should be based on, and if the PBGC issues guidance this may change the direction of the courts.

If you have any questions, please contact me at cshulman@ebeclaw.com or 201-357-0577.


Wednesday, August 3, 2022

Carried Interest Holding Periods



Carried Interest Holding Periods

Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
Teaneck, NJ, 201-357-0577
cshulman@ebeclaw.com

 As discussed in my earlier post on Profits Interest at https://ebeclaw.blogspot.com/2022/03/profits-interests.html , profits interests have become an increasingly popular type of equity-based award if the entity is taxed as a partnership, as they avoid income tax or FICA tax on grant and vesting, and yield long-term capital gains on sale if certain requirements are met. However, in 2017 this was limited in the case of profits interests (carried interest) for professional investors and real estate development for rental or investment to where the holding period is three years. A 2020 legislative proposal in the pending Inflation Reduction Act to increase the holding period for such carried interest from three years to five years and to only begin only once substantially all the partnership interest subject to IRC § 1061 are acquired by the partnership. However, in further negotiations this proposal was taken out of the final bill. 

Pre-2017 Holding Period for Profits Interests – Two Years from Grant and One Year from Vesting. Prior to the enactment of the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act of 2017, generally long-term capital gain treatment for profits interest would require the general one-year holding period requirement (from the date the profits interests are vested). In addition, Rev. Proc. 93-27 would require that the profits interests be held for at least two-years after the date of grant.

Extended Holding Period for Professional Investors and Real Estate Investment to Three Years Under TCJA of 2017. Legislative changes imposed by the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act of 2017 (effective January 1, 2018) enacted a new IRC § 1061, which imposes a three-year holding period (instead of one year for ordinary capital gains) for an "applicable trade or business," if the partnership owns real estate for rental or investments, since IRC § 1061, enacted by the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act of 2017 and effective in 2018, in an effort to clamp down on "carried interest" use of long-term capital gains tax rates for fund managers, provides that "applicable partnership interests" which includes professional investors as well as those developing real estate for rental or investment (IRC § 1061(c)(2)), have an increased holding period for long-term capital gains treatment for three years instead of one year. IRC § 1061(a).

2022 Proposed Legislation to Further Extend Holding Period for Such Carried Interest to Five Years, was Removed from the Bill to Win Approval from Sen. Krysten Sinema. Further legislative changes had been proposed in the Inflation Reduction Act in July 2022, H.R. 5376, as agreed to by Senator Charles Schumer and Senator Joe Manchin to amend IRC § 1061 in the following ways: (i) the holding period for "applicable partnership interests" which, under IRC § 1061(c)(2), includes carried interest for professional investors (e.g., private equity firms and hedge funds) and real estate development for rental or investment, would be increased from three years to five years (except with respect to taxpayers with adjusted gross income of less than $400,000); (ii) the five-year holding period would begin only once substantially all the partnership interest subject to § 1061 are acquired by the partnership; and (iii) the holding period would now apply not just to profits interest but also to other income taxed as long-term capital gains, including qualified dividend income included in net capital gain for purposes of IRC § 1(h)(11), gain from the sale of active business assets under IRC § 1231 and regulated futures contracts subject to IRC § 1256. However, it has now been reported on August 4, 2022 that Democrats are revising their Inflation Reduction Act in order to will approval from Senator Kyrsten Sinema (D. Arizona), which, among other things, would drop the proposed tax increase on carried-interest income. However, the carried interest tax change may appear in future legislation.

If you have any questions, please contact me at cshulman@ebeclaw.com or 201-357-0577.

 

Monday, July 18, 2022

Cryptocurrency – An Imprudent 401(k) Investment?



 Cryptocurrency – An Imprudent 401(k) Investment?

 Charles C. Shulman, Esq.

Teaneck, NJ
201-357-0577
cshulman@ebeclaw.com

CAR No. 2022-01: Presumption of Imprudence on Cryptocurrency for 401(k) Plans. On March 10, 2022, the Department of Labor ("DOL") issued Compliance Assistance Release ("CAR") No. 2022-01, cautioning plan fiduciaries to exercise extreme care before they consider adding a "cryptocurrency" option to a 401(k) plan's investment menu for plan participants, and if they do add the cryptocurrency option, they should be prepared for a possible DOL investigation. CAR No. 2022-01 noted that when a 401(k) plan offers a menu of investment options to plan participants, the responsible fiduciaries have an obligation to ensure the prudence of "each" options on an ongoing basis.[1]

CAR No. 2022-01 cited the recent Supreme Court case of Hughes v. Northwestern University, 142 S.Ct. 737, 742 (2022), which held that even in a participant directed plan where participants choose their investments, plan fiduciaries are required to conduct their own independent evaluation to determine whether "each" investment should be prudently included in the plan's menu of options.

CAR No. 2022-01 states that in this early stage in the history of cryptocurrencies, the DOL has serious concerns about the prudence of a fiduciary's decision to expose 401(k) plan participants to direct investments in cryptocurrencies, or other products whose value is tied to cryptocurrencies, as these are speculative and volatile investments and they present significant risks and challenges to participants' retirement accounts, including significant risks of fraud, theft, and loss, and also raise custodial and recordkeeping concerns. 

DOL Expecting to Investigate Plans that Offer Cryptocurrency – CAR No. 2022-01 noted that the DOL expects to conduct an investigative program aimed at plans that offer participant investments in cryptocurrencies and related products, and to take appropriate action to protect the interests of plan participants and beneficiaries with respect to these investments. Plan fiduciaries responsible for overseeing such investment options or allowing such investments through "brokerage windows" should expect to be questioned about how they can square their actions with their duties of prudence and loyalty in light of the risks described above, according to CAR No. 2022-01.[2]

Fidelity April 2022 Introduction of a Bitcoin Fund in its Core Lineup of 401(k) Investments – Less than two months after the issuance of CAR No. 2022-01, on April 26, 2022 Fidelity Investments announced that it is adding a digital asset fund holding Bitcoin to their core investment lineup for 401(k) funds (although it had been available under its brokerage account for a number of years), and if agreed to by employers for their individual plans, participants will be able to invest up to 20 percent or more of their 401(k) contributions in the Bitcoin fund. This is certainly not congruous with CAR No. 2022-01. However, a DOL official commented on May 23, 2022 that in his view retirement plans that are clients of financial institutions marketing cryptocurrency products will not automatically be subjected to a Department of Labor audit. Reported in Bloomberg Daily Labor Report (May 24, 2022).

Lawsuit Alleging DOL Had no Authority to Issue These New Rules without Administrative Rulemaking and Review – On June 2, 2022, the DOL was sued by ForUsAll, Inc., which was the first 401(k) platform to provide access to cryptocurrency, in the District Court in Washington, D.C., alleging that the DOL violated the Administrative Procedure Act by issuing new fiduciary rules in CAR No. 2022-01 without following the correct procedures.[3] Perhaps in response to this litigation and other pushback on CAR No. 2022-01, DOL Secretary Marty Walsh told a House panel on June 14, 2022 that the DOL is looking at potentially going through a rulemaking process on the cryptocurrency industry as a whole. See Bloomberg Daily Labor Report, June 15, 2022.

Surprises in CAR No. 2021 – CAR No. 2022-01 surprised many practitioners for a number of reasons: (i) CAR No. 2022-01 appears extreme in labeling a cryptocurrency fund from amongst other diverse 401(k) funds as having a presumption of "imprudence;" even if cryptocurrency is volatile and speculative, that contributes not only on the downside but also on the upside; (ii) one would have expected that offering, e.g., a Bitcoin fund as part of a wide variety of diversified funds, and limiting the Bitcoin fund to for example not more than 20% of the account balance, as Fidelity did, should NOT be deemed to be imprudent as a rule or giving rise to an audit for that reason alone; (iii) CAR No. 2022-01 also stated that fiduciaries allowing cryptocurrencies in 401(k) plans even if just though "brokerage windows" should expect to be questioned about how they can square their actions with their ERISA fiduciary duties. Many practitioners were surprised with this added statement, because brokerage windows (which have been around for at least 20 years)[4] have been and continue to be offered in many 401(k) plans, and fiduciaries cannot possibly evaluate each trade in the brokerage accounts.[5]

If you have any questions on this or any other matters, please call me know at 201-357-0577.

Charlie



[1]       DOL EBSA Compliance Assistance Release No. 2022-01 - 401(k) Plan Investments in "Cryptocurrencies" (March 10, 2022), https://tinyurl.com/DOL-2022-01.  

[2]       DOL EBSA Compliance Assistance Release No. 2022-01.

[3]       ForUsAll, Inc. v U.S. Department of Labor and Martin J Walsh Secretary of Labor Complaint, filed with U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C. (June 2, 2022), resources.forusall.com/Dkt.%20001%20ForUsAll%20Complaint.pdf

[4]           Field Assistance Bulletin No. 2012-02R (July 30, 2012) in FAB No. 39 notes that the DOL does not prohibit the use of a platform or a brokerage window, self-directed brokerage account, or similar plan arrangement in an individual account plan. In 2014 the DOL solicited comments regarding standards for brokerage windows in participant directed account plans, although no regulations were issued to date. On occasion, an employer might have to file a Form S-8 registration statement for employer stock if the stock may be purchased by 401(k) plan participants through a brokerage account window. 


[5]       It is true, though, that some plans have shied away from brokerage windows because of the increased investment risk and the inability to monitor the investments. 





Wednesday, June 1, 2022

Profits, Options, Phantoms and Other Equity-Based Awards

 


Profits, Options, Phantoms and Other Equity-Based Awards

Summer 2022

Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

Full article Profits, Options, Phantoms and Other Equity-Based Awards, published in Journal of Deferred Compensation  (WK Summer 2022)  See copy at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/19eBhlDz7nz0BCBKSy57Uh3lTmbhl-6zM/


Equity-based compensation allows employers to reward management, employees and other service providers for increasing a company's value, often without an immediate cash expenditure. The available arrangements differ considerably in their tax treatment, ownership rights, administrative requirements and incentives. This article compares seven principal types of equity-based and performance awards, emphasizing their practical advantages and disadvantages.

1. Profits Interests

Profits interests have become a popular means of compensating management in private equity transactions and other businesses organized as partnerships or limited liability companies taxed as partnerships. A profits interest provides a share of future appreciation and profits, generally after existing investors have recovered their capital investment and achieved a specified return, such as a preferred internal rate of return (IRR). Unlike a capital interest, it ordinarily has no liquidation value when granted.

Tax treatment. Under Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343, the receipt of a qualifying profits interest is generally not taxable. The revenue procedure's favorable treatment does not apply if (1) the interest relates to a substantially certain and predictable income stream, (2) the recipient disposes of the interest within two years, or (3) the interest is a limited partnership interest in a publicly traded partnership.

Rev. Proc. 2001-43, 2001-2 C.B. 191, extends this treatment to substantially nonvested profits interests, provided that the recipient is treated as a partner from the grant date, takes into account the distributive share of partnership income or loss, and neither the partnership nor its partners deducts the interest's value as compensation.

Some practitioners recommend a protective election under IRC § 83(b) within 30 days after the grant of an unvested profits interest, particularly where the interest's qualification for favorable treatment is uncertain.

A subsequent sale of a profits interest may produce long-term capital gain, subject to the applicable holding period and rules governing the character of partnership income and gain. Although the usual long-term capital gain holding period exceeds one year, Rev. Proc. 93-27 excludes dispositions within two years from its safe harbor. Further, IRC § 1061 generally imposes a three-year holding period for certain applicable partnership interests, including carried interests held by investment managers. A § 83(b) election does not eliminate the requirements of § 1061.

Advantages. Qualifying profits interests can provide substantial appreciation taxed at capital gain rates without compensation income at grant or vesting. They generally are not subject to IRC § 409A, may be structured without voting rights, and permit considerable flexibility in allocating future profits. Unlike cash compensation, a qualifying grant generally produces no corresponding compensation deduction for the partnership.

Disadvantages and administrative considerations. Profits interests involve genuine ownership and complicated partnership tax consequences. Recipients generally become partners rather than employees of the issuing partnership, receive Schedules K-1 instead of Forms W-2 for their partnership income, and may incur self-employment tax and lose eligibility for certain employee fringe benefits.

One solution is to separate the entity granting profits interests from the entity employing the recipients. For example, a parent partnership may grant profits interests while a separately classified subsidiary employs the individuals and provides wages and employee benefits. A feeder partnership may sometimes serve a similar purpose. These arrangements require careful tax structuring and additional administration.

Moreover, profits interests generally have no value unless the business appreciates sufficiently to satisfy the applicable distribution hurdles. The allocation and distribution formulas can also be complex.

Accounting. Depending on their terms and substance, profits interests may be accounted for as equity-based compensation or performance-based compensation, potentially requiring expense recognition over the service period or remeasurement.

2. Nonqualified Stock Options (NQSOs)

A nonqualified stock option gives the recipient the right to purchase employer stock at a specified exercise price during a stated period. To qualify for the customary stock-right exemption from IRC § 409A, the exercise price generally must equal or exceed the stock's fair market value on the grant date, and the option must satisfy other regulatory conditions.

Tax treatment. NQSOs generally produce no taxable income at grant or vesting. Upon exercise, the excess of the stock's fair market value over the exercise price is ordinary compensation income, generally subject to employment taxes. The employer ordinarily receives a corresponding tax deduction. Subsequent appreciation is taxed as capital gain when the stock is sold, with long-term treatment if the applicable holding period is satisfied.

IRC § 83(i) permits certain employees of qualifying private corporations with broad-based equity programs to defer income recognition on qualifying stock acquired through option exercises for up to five years. The election is subject to substantial restrictions and generally is unavailable to senior executives and certain other employees.

Advantages. NQSOs reward appreciation without an employer cash expenditure at grant. Recipients generally may decide when to exercise, and options may be awarded to employees, directors and independent contractors. They can also be granted before employment begins, unlike incentive stock options.

Disadvantages. Options become economically unattractive when the share price falls below the exercise price. Exercise may require substantial cash, although cashless exercise arrangements may be available. Recipients incur ordinary income tax on exercise, potentially before receiving sale proceeds, and privately held companies face valuation and liquidity challenges.

Accounting. Option grant-date fair value, generally determined using an option-pricing model, is recognized as compensation expense over the applicable vesting period.

3. Incentive Stock Options (ISOs)

Incentive stock options provide more favorable tax treatment than NQSOs but are subject to the statutory requirements of IRC §§ 421 and 422.

ISOs may be granted only to employees of qualifying corporations. The exercise price must be at least fair market value when granted, or 110% of fair market value for certain shareholders owning more than 10% of the corporation. The plan must receive shareholder approval, and options must generally be exercised within ten years after grant, reduced to five years for 10% shareholders.

The aggregate grant-date fair market value of stock underlying ISOs first exercisable by an employee in any calendar year is limited to $100,000. Options exceeding the limit are treated as nonqualified options to that extent.

Tax treatment. Unlike an NQSO, an ISO generally produces no regular federal income tax upon exercise, although the spread may be included for alternative minimum tax (AMT) purposes. If the employee holds the shares for more than one year after exercise and more than two years after grant, the appreciation generally qualifies for long-term capital gain treatment.

The employer ordinarily receives no compensation deduction on a qualifying disposition. However, if the employee disposes of the shares before satisfying the holding periods, part of the gain may be treated as ordinary compensation income, with a corresponding employer deduction.

Advantages and disadvantages. ISOs can provide substantial capital gain benefits without ordinary income tax at exercise. However, the AMT exposure, holding periods, statutory limitations and absence of an employer deduction reduce their attractiveness. Recipients generally must remain employed until no more than three months before exercise, subject to statutory exceptions. ISOs also cannot be issued with respect to ownership interests in an entity taxed as a partnership.

The accounting treatment generally parallels that of NQSOs.

4. Restricted Stock Awards

Restricted stock consists of actual company shares transferred to an employee or other service provider, subject to forfeiture until specified vesting conditions are satisfied. Vesting generally depends on continued service, performance goals or both.

Unlike stock options, restricted shares retain value even if the stock price declines. Recipients may also receive voting and dividend rights from the grant date, depending on the award terms.

Tax treatment. Under IRC § 83(a), restricted stock ordinarily is not taxable upon grant but becomes taxable as ordinary compensation income when substantially vested. The taxable amount generally equals the fair market value of the shares, less any amount paid by the recipient. The employer receives a corresponding deduction, subject to applicable limitations.

Alternatively, the recipient may make an election under IRC § 83(b) within 30 days after the transfer, recognizing the value of the stock at grant rather than vesting. Subsequent appreciation may then qualify for long-term capital gain treatment upon sale.

The principal disadvantage of a § 83(b) election is that the recipient pays tax at grant without assurance that the shares will vest or retain their value. If the stock is later forfeited, the previously paid income tax generally is not recoverable.

Advantages. Restricted stock provides immediate equity ownership, greater downside value than options and potential capital gain treatment on appreciation following an effective § 83(b) election. Actual transfers of restricted stock generally are outside IRC § 409A.

Disadvantages. Tax at vesting may create a liquidity problem, particularly in private companies. Voting and dividend rights may also complicate the company's ownership arrangements, and restricted shares cause actual shareholder dilution.

Accounting. Restricted stock generally is accounted for as equity-based compensation, with expense recognized over the requisite service period.

5. Phantom Stock and Restricted Stock Units (RSUs)

Phantom stock and restricted stock units provide compensation measured by the value of company shares without transferring actual ownership at grant. Both generally represent unfunded, unsecured contractual promises to make a payment at a future date.

RSUs typically settle in employer stock, while phantom stock ordinarily settles in cash. Vesting generally depends on continued service, performance goals or a combination of both.

Tax treatment. Neither arrangement ordinarily produces taxable income at grant. The recipient generally recognizes ordinary compensation income when cash or shares are delivered, and the employer ordinarily receives a corresponding deduction. Because no property is transferred at grant, a § 83(b) election is unavailable.

Phantom stock and RSUs must comply with or qualify for an exemption from IRC § 409A. One common approach is to require settlement within the short-term deferral period, generally no later than 2½ months after the end of the applicable taxable year in which the award is no longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. Awards with later settlement dates must generally comply with § 409A's restrictions on payment timing and acceleration.

Employment taxes may arise at vesting even when settlement is deferred, under the special timing rules for nonqualified deferred compensation.

Advantages. Phantom stock and RSUs provide incentives tied to company value without requiring the recipient to purchase shares. Phantom stock is particularly useful for closely held businesses that wish to reward employees without admitting additional shareholders or relinquishing voting control. Income tax generally is postponed until settlement.

Disadvantages. Payments are taxed as ordinary compensation rather than capital gain. Participants generally do not obtain shareholder rights before settlement, although dividend equivalents may be provided. IRC § 409A also limits flexibility in determining payment dates and accelerating distributions.

Accounting. Equity-settled RSUs generally involve grant-date fair-value accounting, while cash-settled phantom awards may require periodic liability remeasurement.

6. Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs)

Stock appreciation rights give recipients the right to receive the increase in the value of specified company shares between grant and exercise, ordinarily payable in cash or stock.

SARs are economically similar to stock options, but recipients need not pay an exercise price to obtain the appreciation.

Tax treatment. A SAR generally is not taxable at grant or vesting. Upon exercise or settlement, the amount received is ordinary compensation income, ordinarily giving rise to a corresponding employer deduction.

SARs may qualify for an exemption from IRC § 409A if the exercise price or base value is at least the underlying stock's fair market value on the grant date, the underlying stock satisfies the service-recipient-stock requirements, and the award does not provide an additional deferral feature.

Advantages. SARs reward stock appreciation without requiring recipients to finance an exercise price or become shareholders. Cash-settled SARs also avoid issuing additional shares.

Disadvantages. Like stock options, SARs provide limited incentives when company value does not appreciate. Payments are taxed as ordinary compensation, and the employer may incur a substantial cash obligation upon settlement. Valuation and § 409A compliance can be particularly important for private companies.

Accounting. SAR expense generally is recognized over the vesting period, with additional remeasurement required for cash-settled liability awards.

7. Performance Awards and Bonuses

Performance awards provide cash or stock compensation upon attainment of specified individual, business-unit or company-wide goals. The terms generally establish eligibility, performance measures, threshold and target awards, and treatment upon termination of employment or a change in control.

Performance awards are particularly useful where an employer wishes to reward specific business results, such as profitability, revenue growth, investment returns or other measurable objectives, without necessarily granting actual equity.

Tax treatment. Performance bonuses generally are taxable as ordinary compensation when paid, with a corresponding employer deduction subject to applicable limitations.

Awards that are paid within the short-term deferral period generally are exempt from IRC § 409A. Awards involving longer deferrals must comply with § 409A, including its requirements governing payment events and restrictions on acceleration. Employment taxes may apply at vesting even if payment is deferred.

Advantages. Performance awards can be tailored to specific business objectives, encourage accountability and avoid issuing additional equity. They also may be structured to balance annual and long-term performance goals.

Disadvantages. Performance standards and payout calculations can become complicated, particularly where several financial or operational measures are involved. Awards may lose their retention value if the performance goals appear unattainable. Long-term arrangements also require careful § 409A drafting.

Accounting. Cash performance bonuses generally are accrued when payment becomes probable and reasonably estimable. Equity-settled performance awards ordinarily are accounted for under the applicable share-based compensation rules.

Conclusion

The appropriate form of equity-based compensation depends on the employer's ownership structure, tax objectives, liquidity, willingness to dilute existing shareholders and desired incentive.

Profits interests can provide particularly favorable tax treatment for businesses taxed as partnerships, but create ownership and administrative complications. NQSOs and SARs reward future appreciation without transferring immediate ownership. ISOs offer potentially favorable capital gain treatment but impose significant statutory restrictions. Restricted stock provides actual ownership and the possibility of capital gain treatment through a § 83(b) election. Phantom stock and RSUs provide equity-linked incentives without immediate ownership, while performance awards permit employers to target particular business objectives.

In selecting among these arrangements, the tax consequences to the recipient and employer, the requirements of IRC §§ 83 and 409A, and the practical costs of administration should be considered together.

See https://drive.google.com/file/d/19eBhlDz7nz0BCBKSy57Uh3lTmbhl-6zM/


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