Thursday, June 1, 2023

Affordable Care Act Employer Mandate Penalties and Solutions, Individual Coverage HRAs and Health Plan Nondiscrimination Rules


Affordable Care Act Employer Mandate Penalties and Solutions, Individual Coverage HRAs and Health Plan Nondiscrimination Rules

212-380-3834 / 201-357-0577 (blog)

The IRS has been issuing preliminary penalty calculations to employers relating to the Affordable Care Act Employer Shared Responsibility Mandate (the "Employer Mandate"). The following is a review of the issues and solutions for employers regarding the Employer Mandate, interaction with new individual coverage HRAs (ICHRAs), health plan nondiscrimination rules and related issues

1. Family Health Coverage Must be Offered to Substantially all Full Time Employees – But Most of the Premiums Can be Shifted to the Employees

          a. Penalty on Each Full-Time Employee if Family Coverage not Offered to 95% of FTEs. Under the Employer Mandate rules contained in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (the "ACA"), if an employer employs 50 or more "full-time employees," i.e., employees for 30+ hours a week on average, it must offer family health insurance coverage that meets the "minimum essential coverage" standards of the ACA to 95% or more of their full time employees. If it does not offer the family health insurance coverage to 95% of the full-time employees there would be a significant penalty under Code § 4980H(a) of $2,880 a year (for 2023) for each full time employee (minus the first 30 employees) even for those who have been offered or enrolled in the group health plan.

          b. Coverage to 95% of FTEs Must Offer Minimum Essential Coverage. In order to avoid this significant penalty, an employer must offer to substantially all (95%) of the full-time employees health insurance coverage that meets the "minimum essential coverage" standards of the ACA or an individual coverage HRA (which is considered sufficient even without minimum essential coverage). However, as the rule is currently written, it should be permitted to shift the bulk of the premiums to the employees, because as long as it offers family health coverage, the coverage does not have to be "affordable." 

          c. ICHRA Considered Offering of Coverage. With regard to individual coverage HRAs, the IRS, DOL and HHS FAQs on New Health Coverage Options for Employers and Employees, Q:7 states that: "An offer of an individual coverage HRA discussed below counts as an offer of coverage under the employer mandate." Under 2019 regulations, those who are offered group coverage cannot also be reimbursed for individual premiums, but the 95% rule can be satisfied by offering, e.g., one identifiable group with individual coverage HRAs and the other identifiable group with group health coverage.

          d. If Offered to 95% but the Coverage is not Affordable, a Smaller Penalty Would be Imposed (i.e., Only for the Number of FTEs receiving Exchange Coverage and a Premium Tax Credit). Even if 95% are offered group coverage (or an individual coverage HRA), it would not be considered "affordable" if the employees have to pay the bulk of the premiums. Thus, there would be a smaller penalty of $4,320 (for 2023) under Code § 4980H(b) for any full-time employees who, because the premiums are so high, buys individual Marketplace Exchange coverage and is entitled to a premium tax credit for all or a portion of cost of the Exchange premium. This penalty is not based on all employees but only on those employees who opt for Exchange coverage and receive a premium tax credit. In our experience only a minority of employees purchase their insurance through the Marketplace Exchange (especially in urban areas), because so few hospitals and doctors accept marketplace insurance. Thus, as long as 95% of the employees with 30+ hours a week are offered family coverage (even on an employee-pay-all basis), the penalty is likely to be very minor.

2. Report if Family Group Coverage was Offered to All Full Time Employees on Annual Form 1095-C to be given to Employees and Annual Form 1094-C to be Filed with the IRS

An employer or affiliated group with 50 or more full-time employees must provide the employees who were eligible for group health insurance an annual IRS Form 1095-C indicating which months in the year they were offered group health coverage and what the premiums for family coverage would be during that period, as set forth in the instructions to the form. Form 1095-C is for the employee's records but need not be attached to the employees' individual tax return.

IRS Form 1094-C is an annual return filed with the IRS indicating the number of employees who were eligible for group health coverage during each of the 12 months, whether these employees were offered group family health coverage (with minimum essential coverage - which your insurance plans most likely are), full time employee count and all employee count and list of affiliated employers.

Often, the insurance company will provide the information for these forms.

3. Determination of Full-Time Status of Employees for Purposes for Eligibility for Health Insurance Coverage

Determination of full time status for purposes of being eligible for health insurance coverage is made depending on whether the employee has worked an average of 30 hours per week (or 130 hours per month), during a "standard measurement period" which is a 3-12 month period that the employer chooses at its discretion (but on a consistent basis). At the end of the standard measurement period the employer must during an administrative period" (not more than 90 days) determine an employee’s eligibility, discuss the employee’s status with them, explain the premiums required to be paid by the employee and enroll them in the plan if they elect to do so. During a "stability period" (6-12 months and not shorter than the Standard Measurement Period), the employees' enrollment  remains protected even if their hours drop below 30 per week until the Stability Period has ended and eligibility is determined again.

One example used by some companies is a 9 month period of the previous year (e.g., Jan. to Sept. of the previous year) for determining whether the employee average hours per month is over 130 hours. The administrative period (up to 90 days) could be Oct. to Dec. to determine an employee’s eligibility and offer to enroll them in the plan. For those who have over 130 hours a month, the "stability period" could be 9 months. Another alternative used by other companies is a 3 month determination period, a one month administrative period and a 6 month stability period.

4. Notice of Eligibility

A notice of eligibility should explain that the employees are eligible for group health insurance for their family with the cost (or where to obtain the cost) of the premiums.

A similar notice could be sent to the group offered the individual coverage HRA.

5. Nondiscrimination Testing for Insured Health Insurance Coverage Currently Only Affects the Ability of Highly Compensated Employees to Make Employee Contributions for Premiums on a Pre-tax Basis

In terms of nondiscrimination rules for health insurance coverage, unless the group health plan is self-insured, there are currently no nondiscrimination restrictions even if the higher paid employees receive a larger share of subsidized premiums. (This should be monitored from year to year, because there may be new regulations under the ACA that could apply § 105(h) to insured plans.)   If a health plan If it is self-insured, there are two nondiscrimination tests in Code § 105(h). The eligibility test of § 105(h) is based on whether enough non-highly compensation individuals are benefiting from the plan using the 70% test, the ratio percentage test and the nondiscrimination test based on facts and circumstances test of Code § 410(b). The benefits test determines if all participants are eligible for the same benefits, and requires that the plan’s terms as written do not discriminate and plan operation comply on a facts and circumstances basis. A Highly Compensated Individual is (i) one of the five highest-paid officers; (ii) a shareholder who owns more than 10% of the value of the employer’s stock; or (iii) among the highest-paid 25% of all employees.

6. Reimbursing Individual Coverage Premiums through an HRA and Restriction on Offering the Same Group the Individual Premiums HRA and Group Health Coverage

Historically, reimbursing employees for their individual health insurance premiums was problematic for various reasons, including (i) taxability to the employee for such reimbursement, and (ii) inadvertently creating a group health plan which would be subject to ACA requirements such as yearly dollar limits.

However, on June 20, 2019, the Trump administration finalized rules for "individual coverage Health Reimbursement Arrangements" or "ICHRAs" that could be used to allow employers to reimburse employees for individual health insurance premiums through an individual coverage HRA instead of offering a group health plan.

An employee reimbursed through the ICHRA should also be able to enroll in individual health insurance coverage through the Marketplace Exchange or through a private plan. However, if you opt to take the ICHRA coverage you would probably lose your ability to qualify for a premium tax credit to help pay for Marketplace coverage.

2019 rules in Treas. Reg. § 54.9802-4(c)(2), DOL Reg. § 2590.702-2 & HHS Reg. § 146.123(c)(2), 84 Fed. Reg. 28888, 28895 (June 20, 2019), provide that "To the extent a plan sponsor offers any class of employees ... an individual coverage HRA, the plan sponsor may not also offer a traditional group health plan to the same class of employees." The reason for this rule as explained in the Preamble 84 Fed. Reg. at  28895 is in order to prevent a plan sponsor from intentionally or unintentionally steering any participants or dependents with adverse health factors away from the plan sponsor’s traditional group health plan and into the individual market.

"Group of employees" is described in paragraph (d) of the above regulations as including, e.g., employees working in different locations, employees in or not in a unit covered by a specific union contract, employees who have or have not satisfied a waiting period, nonresident aliens and U.S. citizen employees, salaried and hourly employees, etc. Of course, the same person could not be offered group health coverage and decline and be offered reimbursement of individual premiums or vice versa, as one person could certainly not be two plans.

Thus, a separate identifiable group could be offered group coverage and another identifiable group could be offered the individual coverage HRA. Both satisfy the 95% substantially all requirement for 30+ hour employees who must be offered coverage under the firm's group health plan or an individual coverage HRA in order to avoid the large penalty of Code § 4980H(a). For the group that is offered group health coverage, if individuals in that group decline coverage, they cannot then be offered reimbursement of individual premiums under an individual coverage HRA.

Additional issues arise in connection with these matters, and I would be happy to discuss them with you. If you have any questions, please contact me at number or email listed above.


Tuesday, October 25, 2022

Withdrawal Liability Actuarial Assumptions – Did New Proposed PBGC Regs Get it Wrong?

28 WK J. Deferred Comp. 7 (Winter 2023)
Nov. 11, 2022

Withdrawal Liability Actuarial Assumptions – Did New Proposed PBGC Regs Get it Wrong?

Teaneck, NJ


Actuarial interest rate assumptions for Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) withdrawal liability, which are relevant for purposes of determining an employer withdrawal liability for withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan are to be made by the plan actuary using reasonable actuarial interest rate assumptions (which may sometimes be termination rate assumptions or ongoing plan assumptions or a combination depending on what is reasonable for the plan) under ERISA § 4213(a)(1). However, notwithstanding the above, once Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) are issued; the plan actuary must instead comply with such regulations in determining the actuarial interest rate assumptions. Several recent federal courts have ruled that ongoing minimum funding rates should have been used in those cases by the plan actuary in determining withdrawal liability, under ERISA § 4213(a)(1).

However, PBGC regulations under § 4213(a)(2) have just been issued in proposed form, and once finalized, plan actuaries can use plan termination interest rate assumptions, which, according to the PBGC, will apparently be deemed to comply with the actuarial assumption requirements, thus shielding the plans from legal challenges regarding their choice of the actuarial interest rate assumptions. But this is a difficult argument to make, since ERISA § 4213(a)(1) does require reasonable actuarial assumptions that can be challenged in court, and the newly proposed regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) give the plan actuary a permitted range of assumptions, (i.e., plan termination assumptions or ongoing funding assumptions or anything in between) a court could logically read these regulations and § 4213(a)(2) to require that when an actuary chooses an interest rate in the permitted range, it must be a reasonable choice.

Under ERISA § 4201, withdrawal liability is imposed on an employer that withdraws from an underfunded multiemployer pension plan based on the withdrawing employer’s allocated share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits (UVBs) which are the value of vested benefits minus the value of plan assets, as of the last day of the preceding plan year.


ERISA § 4213(a) sets forth rules regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining the UVBs of the multiemployer pension plan for purposes of determining withdrawal liability, as follows:

(i)         If the PBGC has not yet issued regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining the plan’s UVBs, then the plan actuary may use actuarial interest rate assumptions that are in the aggregate reasonable (based on the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations), and which offer the actuary’s “best estimate” of anticipated experience under the plan.

(ii)        If the PBGC has issued final regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining a plan’s UVBs, the actuary must use the actuarial assumptions and methods set forth in such PBGC regulations.

Until recently, the PBGC had not issued any regulations regarding the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining withdrawal liability. This left open the issue in each case as to whether the multiemployer plan’s actuary has used reasonable actuarial assumptions. However, on October 14, 2022, the PBGC issued proposed regulations that once finalized will determine the actuarial interest rate assumptions to be used in determining withdrawal liability.


In practice, prior to final PBGC regulations, actuaries have various ways of measuring unfunded vested benefits. For a withdrawal of a participating employer in an ongoing multiemployer pension plan, it may be reasonable to use the plan’s ongoing “minimum funding” assumptions, which are typically determined at a higher interest rate, thus yielding a lower withdrawal liability, and being more favorable to withdrawing employers. (Of course, if a multiemployer plan is terminating in a mass termination, the PBGC termination rate assumptions are to be used.) On the other hand, actuaries sometimes use PBGC plan termination assumptions (or insurance company annuity close-out rates, which are substantially the same as plan termination assumptions), which uses a lower interest rate, thus yielding a higher withdrawal liability and being more favorable to the multiemployer pension fund. Use of the termination rate assumptions is apparently based on the theory that for the employer permanently withdrawing from the multiemployer plan its applicable share should be viewed in terms of a termination of the plan that is likely to occur in the future.


Although a multiemployer pension plan generally does not terminate when a withdrawal of a participating employer takes place, it can be argued that withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it does not represent an ongoing funding relationship but rather a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants in the multiemployer plan. Using ongoing funding rates would likely have the result of backloading liability, with withdrawal liability obligations to be largest for those who withdraw from the fund the latest (or for those participating employers who are still participating when the multiemployer plan terminates in a mass withdrawal). This disproportionate liability on employers that remain in the multiemployer plan after most other employers have withdrawn (the last man standing) can cause disproportionate backloading of liabilities. This is further exacerbated when some of the participating employers have gone into bankruptcy.


Several recent federal cases have sided with withdrawing employers in challenging the plan actuary’s assumptions when the actuary did not use ongoing minimum funding assumptions.

D.C. Circuit Rules in a 2022 Case for the Withdrawing Employer that Ongoing Funding Obligations Should Have Been Used. In a 2022 case, the D.C. Circuit held that where the multiemployer fund actuary used plan termination interest assumption of 2.7–2.8 percent (yielding a very high withdrawal liability) even though the actuary was using a 7.5 percent assumption (the minimum funding), the plan termination assumptions must represent the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan, and therefore the withdrawal liability calculations were not reasonable. United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan v. Energy West Mining Company, 39 F.4th 730 (D.C. Cir. 2022). In that case, a multiemployer pension fund brought an action under ERISA against a withdrawing employer seeking to enforce arbitrators' award upholding the pension fund actuary’s calculation of withdrawal liability through the use of a risk-free termination discount rate. The D.C. Circuit overturned the arbitrator’s ruling since the termination assumption used by the plan actuary and which was not chosen based on the plan’s projected performance was not reasonable and instead, the actuary should have considered the pension funding discount rate assumptions taking into account anticipated projected investment returns as applicable for pension minimum funding.

Two Cases Challenging a Blended Rate and Holding Ongoing Minimum Funding Rate was Appropriate. Some actuaries use the blend of insurance company annuity close-out rates and plan funding assumptions. For example, the “Segal Blend” method determines a plan’s unfunded vested benefits for withdrawal liability based on a blend of (i) the insurance company annuity purchase rates used by the PBGC for plan terminations; and (ii) the actuary’s assumption of future investment returns used for determining the plan funding requirements. Although the multiemployer plan is generally not terminating in a withdrawal liability case, withdrawal liability is different than funding an ongoing plan because it represented not an ongoing funding relationship but a one-time transfer of risk from the withdrawing employer to the continuing employers and participants.

In a 2021 case, Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trustees of the Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund, 15 F.4th 407 (6th Cir. 2021), the Fund’s actuary used a 7.25 percent rate for minimum funding purposes, but for withdrawal-liability purposes used the Segal Blend taking the interest rate used for minimum-funding purposes and blending it with the PBGC’s published interest rates on annuities (2–3 percent), even though the actuary conceded that the PBGC annuity close-out rates would be what is used in terminating a multiemployer plan. The court ruled that this blended formula violated ERISA in this case, as using the Segal Blend in an ongoing plan violated ERISA’s mandate under ERISA § 4213(a)(1) that the interest rate for withdrawal liability calculations be based on the anticipated experience under the plan.

Likewise, a 2018 Southern District of New York case invalidated the use of the Segal Blend. New York Times Company v. Newspaper and Mail Delivers’ Publishers Pension Fund, 303 F. Supp. 3d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), holding that in a withdrawal from an ongoing plan where the minimum funding rate would be the actuary’s best estimate, blending with a lower no-risk PBGC bond rate should not be accepted as the anticipated plan experience.


On October 14, 2022, the PBGC issued proposed regulations that once finalized would, pursuant to ERISA § 4213(a)(2), set forth in the actuarial assumptions and methods that may be used by a plan actuary for the purpose of determining an employer’s withdrawal liability.

Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11, 87 Fed. Reg. 62316 (Oct. 14, 2022). These proposed regulations were issued in part in response to the above unfavorable cases for multiemployer plan withdrawal liability, as lower withdrawal liability based on ongoing funding interest rate assumptions leaves multiemployer plans with greater underfunding, which could increase PBGC risk.

As stated in the Preamble, the proposed regulations in § 4213.11(b) make it clear that the use of ERISA § 4044 rates (plan termination assumptions), either as a standalone assumption or combined with minimum funding interest assumptions represents a valid approach to selecting an interest rate assumption to determine withdrawal liability in basically all circumstances.

Under Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11(c), assumptions and methods other than the interest assumption would have to offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan. Proposed PBGC Reg. § 4213.11(b) would specifically permit the use of an interest rate in withdrawal liability assumptions to be ERISA § 4044 plan termination rates alone or minimum funding rates alone or anywhere in the middle, although as stated in the Preamble, the main import of the regulations is to allow plan actuaries to use of ERISA § 4044 plan termination assumptions even as a standalone assumption as a valid approach in determining withdrawal liability.

It appears from the Preamble to the proposed regulations that the PBGC believes that any interest rate assumptions permitted by the PBGC regulations would generally be shielded from challenge in arbitration or litigation since the choice of termination interest rate assumptions is a proper assumption under the regulations. The Preamble states that this could save both the plan and employers on arbitration and litigation costs, which until now have ranged from $82,500 to $222,000 for a withdrawal liability arbitration dispute, and can run over $1 million for a lengthy litigation.

The Preamble also states that the PBGC estimates that, in the 20 years following the final rule’s effective date, there will be an increase in aggregate withdrawal liability payments ranging between $804 million and $2.98 billion.


•          There is likely to be some objections to the above-proposed PBGC regulations. Employer withdrawal liability imposes a large and often unexpected burden on unionized companies that participate in multiemployer pension plans. For many employers, the potential withdrawal liability may discourage interested buyers of the company or push the employer into bankruptcy. In addition, higher ERISA withdrawal liability amounts will further dissuade companies from using a unionized workforce with a multiemployer pension plan.

•          Under the proposed PBGC regulations, multiemployer plan actuaries are much more likely to use plan termination assumptions in calculating withdrawal liability, relying on the new regulations and the authority given under the regulations pursuant to ERISA § 4213(a)(2), which can greatly increase withdrawal liability and exacerbate the issues raised in the previous paragraph.

•          The PBGC believes that, under the proposed regulations, any assumptions used by the plan actuary, including plan termination assumptions would generally be immune from judicial challenge, and thus, there would be little ability to challenge withdrawal liability calculations. However, this purported immunity is likely to be challenged in litigation, as the PBGC regulations give a range of permitted actuarial interest rate assumptions from plan termination assumptions to ongoing minimum funding assumptions or any combination. The PBGC believes that since ERISA § 4213(a)(2) and the proposed regulations do not state anything about reasonable assumptions, the courts will view the range permitted in the regulations as a non-reviewable standard by the plan actuary not subject to judicial review. However, this is a difficult argument to make, since ERISA § 4213(a)(1) does require reasonable assumptions, and the regulations under ERISA § 4213(a)(2) give a permitted range of assumptions, it would be a logical reading of ERISA that a choice under a range of assumptions by the plan actuary must be reasonable and could be challenged in court or arbitration.

•          Also, since interest rates and plan performance over time tend to fluctuate, fixing the withdrawal liability interest at ERISA § 4044 termination liability rates may yield an overly high withdrawal liability, which may not be warranted in the long run when the plan performance increases.

•          The proposed PBGC regulations would be effective with respect to employer withdrawals occurring on or after the final regulations are published (or some other date to be set in the final PBGC regulations), but presumably, they would be effective for purposes of valuing unfunded vested benefits as of the end of the plan year prior to the year in which the employer withdrawal occurs even if the prior plan year ended prior to the issuance of final regulations.

If you have any questions, please contact me at number or email listed above.



Pension & Welfare Plan Limits Cost-Of-Living Adjustments For 2023



Charles C. Shulman, Esq.  
Teaneck, NJ
 201-357-0577 212-380-3834


2023 retirement and welfare plan limits are increased to take into account cost-of-living adjustments.

Pension Plan and Related Limits



Pre-tax elective deferral maximum under IRC § 401(k), 403(b), and 457(b) plans (IRC §§ 402(g)(3) & 457 (e)(15))



Age 50 and older “catch-up” for 401(k), 403(b), and governmental 457(b) plans and SEPs (IRC § 414(v)(2)(B)(i))



Annual compensation limit under IRC §§ 401(a)(17), 404(l) and 408(k)



401(a)(17) annual comp. limit - governmental plans grandfathered on 7-1-1993



Annual benefit limit for defined benefit plans under IRC § 415(b)



Annual contribution limit for defined contribution plans under IRC § 415(c)



Highly compensated employee threshold for nondiscrimination testing in the following year under IRC § 414(q)(1)(B)



Key employee threshold for officers for top heavy plan under IRC § 416(i)(1)(A)(i)



ESOP account balance for five and one year distributions under IRC § 409(o)(1)(C)(ii)

$1,230,000 / $245,000

$1,330,000 / $265,000

Limit on premiums paid for QLACs (qualified longevity annuity contracts) under Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 (adopted 2014)



Minimum earnings level to qualify for SEP under IRC § 408(k)



SIMPLE plan elective deferral limit under IRC § 408(p)(2)(E)



SIMPLE 401(k) or IRA age 50 catch-up (IRC § 414(v)(2)(B)(ii))



Basic/Roth IRA contribution limit under IRC §§ 219(b)(5)(A) & 408A. (With age 50 $1,000 IRA catchups that do not have cost-of-living adjustments)



AGI (adjusted gross income) phase-out of deduction for IRA where participant or spouse contributing to IRA also participates in employer-sponsored retirement plan (IRC § 219(g)).
For married joint filers –
For single filers –


$109,000 to $129,000


$68,000 to



$116,000 to $136,000


$73,000 to


AGI phase-out of deduction for IRA for married persons filing jointly where participant's spouse who is contributing to IRA also participates in employer-sponsored retirement plan (IRC § 219(g)(7))

$204,000 to $214,000

$218,000 to $228,000

AGI Phase-out deduction for contributions to Roth IRA for married persons filing jointly (IRC § 408A(c)(3)(B)).
For married joint filers –
For single filers –

$204,000 to $214,000

$129,000 to $144,000

$218,00 to $228,000

$138,000 to $153,000

Health Savings Account contribution limits (single and family)

$3,650 and $7,300

$3,850 and $7,750

PBGC guaranteed benefit (annual single life annuity beginning at age 65)

($6,204.55 a month)

($6,750 a month)

PBGC flat-rate premium per participant for a single-employer plan



PBGC variable-rate premium per $1,000 for single-employer plans of Unfunded Vested Benefits  
With a Per Participant Cap for variable-rate premium of –





PBGC premium for multiemployer plan per participant



Taxable wage base subject to FICA tax



DOL Penalties per day

-- Failure to file annual report (Form 5500) - ERISA § 502(c)(2) (originally $1,000 a day)

-- Failure to provide blackout notices or notices of diversification rights ERISA § 502(c)(7) (originally $100 a day)







Health FSA (flexible spending account) limit IRC § 125(i)



Health FSA carryover amount



HRA maximum employer contribution Treas. Reg. § 54.9831-1(c)(3)(viii)(B)



HSA (health savings account)

(i) Individual limit (ii) Family limit IRC § 223(b)(2)





HDHP minimum deductibles
(i) Self-only (ii) Family
IRC § 223(c)





HDHP maximum out-of-pocket amounts for (i) self and (ii) family IRC § 223(c)





Qualified transportation fringe benefit and parking program IRC § 132(f)(2)



Social Security taxable wage base



Social Security tax up to SS wage base

(SS and Medicare taxed both on employer & employee or double for self-employed).



Medicare Tax no limit  (Plus additional 0.9% Medicare tax for wages in excess of $250,000 for joint filers, $200,000 for singles after 2012)



Social Security cost of living increase